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Under § 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor’s plan of 
reorganization cannot be confirmed unless at least one “impaired class” accepts 
the plan, excluding acceptance of any insider of the debtor.1  A class of claims 
accepts the plan if more than one-half in number and at least two-thirds in 
amount of claims voting in a class favor the plan.2  Thus, a debtor’s composition 
of its classes clearly has a substantial impact upon its chances of successfully 
confirming its plan of reorganization over dissenting creditors.  Obviously, the 
debtor would like to have unfettered power and full discretion to group creditors 
in a way that increases the likelihood that the majority in each class will vote on 
the plan it proposes.3  This means that the debtor will do whatever is possible to 
isolate unfriendly and dissenting creditors.  In some cases, this classification 
                                                 
 + Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Law School. 
 1. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 2. § 1126(c). 
 3. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 
2017) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY] (illustrating agreements by which the debtor can 
increase support for the proposed plan). 
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treatment is criticized as impermissible gerrymandering in contravention of § 
1122 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 
Section 1122(a) expressly provides that only substantially similar claims may 
be placed in the same class.5  It does not, however, expressly require that all 
substantially similar claims be placed in the same class, nor does it expressly 
prohibit substantially similar claims from being classified separately.6  Several 
courts, nonetheless, hold that “Section 1122 [] must contemplate some limits on 
classification of claims of similar [rights].”7  Other courts disagree.8  This creates 
confusion and unpredictability and courts are yet to agree on a uniform approach 
to deal with this classification issue. 
The additional requirement of § 1129(a)(10) that the accepting class be 
“impaired” creates further tension amongst courts, scholars and practitioners.9  
Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code states that a creditor’s claim is “impaired” 
unless its rights are left “unaltered” by the plan.10  Several cases hold that an 
alteration intended only to create an impaired class to vote for a plan so that a 
debtor can confirm it over other dissenting classes is not allowed.11  These cases 
note that such manipulation – referred to as “artificial impairment” – is contrary 
to the purpose of § 1129(a)(10), which, these cases suggest, is designed to 
provide some indicia of support for a plan by truly harmed creditors – i.e., those 
with a real financial stake in the outcome of the debtor’s case.12  Other cases, 
however, hold that the broad language in § 1124 allows any legal, equitable, or 
contractual alteration of rights to constitute impairment, including the slightest 
impairment of de minimis claims, and that abuses on the part of a plan proponent 
ought not affect the application of Congress’s definition of impairment.13 
Although an issue in all Chapter 11 cases, the battle over improper 
classification and artificial impairment is widely prevalent in Single Asset Real 
Estate (SARE) cases, where a primary obstacle to confirmation is finding a “plan 
                                                 
 4. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 821 (1992) (stating “thou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to 
gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan”). 
 5. § 1122(a). 
 6. See In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, Nos. 99–12287–JMD, CM 99–747, 1999 WL 33457789, 
at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 1999) (finding that the majority of circuits “hold that separate classification 
of legally similar claims is not prohibited”). 
 7. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at 1278–79, see e.g. In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 
202, 216 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 8. CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789, at *4. 
 9. See In re Combustion Eng’r, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 243–44 (3rd Cir. 2004); In re Vill. at 
Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2013); In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d 
940, 943 (9th Cir. 1993); In re All Land Inv., LLC, 468 B.R. 676, 689–90 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012). 
 11. In re Windsor on the River Assocs., 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993); see also infra note 
176 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Windsor on the River Assocs., 7 F.3d at 131. 
 13. L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 943. 
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[that] is accepted by at least one [creditor] class of impaired claims.”14  Under 
the Bankruptcy Code, real property is “single asset real estate” only if it is a 
single property or project from which the debtor derives substantially all of the 
debtor’s gross income.15  This narrow definition means only a few classes of 
creditors generally exist in a typical SARE case: (1) a secured claim against the 
real property held by the mortgagee; (2) a rather large unsecured deficiency 
claim also held by the mortgagee since the real property is usually underwater; 
and (3) a few general unsecured claims held by trade creditors.16  In most cases, 
the mortgagee is unsupportive of the debtor’s plan to reorganize and its sole 
purpose is to foreclose on the real property securing the loan.  As such, it is 
critical for the SARE debtor to classify the hostile mortgagee’s unsecured 
deficiency claim separately from the other unsecured claims, since the sheer size 
of a typical deficiency claim would generally allow the deficiency claimant to 
block confirmation by controlling the vote of a single unsecured creditor class.  
Without this separation, there would be no impaired accepting class and the 
SARE debtor could not confirm its plan – i.e., it would eventually lose its 
property (and its business) through a foreclosure.  In addition to this common 
classification maneuvering in order to isolate the deficiency claim, the SARE 
debtor may attempt to minimally alter – that is, “artificially impair” – the 
friendly, isolated class of trade creditors to secure the needed vote necessary to 
comply with § 1129(a)(10).17 
Courts, practitioners, and scholars are continuously at odds over the meaning 
of the code provisions that govern the concepts of classification and impairment.  
The current approaches for dealing with these sections, particularly in SARE 
cases, yield confusion and actually make the reorganization process needlessly 
complex, costly, and unpredictable.  Even more problematic is that the muddle 
surrounding these code provisions results in decisions which are contrary to the 
congressional intent behind the Chapter 11 reorganization process.18  But courts 
do not need to construe these code sections in order to make a determination of 
the improper classification and artificial impairment issues.  Rather, this Article 
contends that improper classification and artificial impairment should go to a 
debtor’s good faith in proposing a plan under § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy 
Code – i.e., improper classification and artificial impairment should be nothing 
more than components of the good-faith analysis required by § 1129(a)(3). 
                                                 
 14. See infra note 93. 
 15. § 101(51B). 
 16. See H. Miles Cohn, Single Asset Chapter 11 Cases, 26 TULSA L.J. 523, 527–28 (1991). 
 17. See In re RYYZ, LLC., 490 B.R. 29, 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing how the 
debtor can affect the de minimis impairment of claims and variety of opinions courts continue to 
hold). 
 18. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing how 
the Windsor court had imposed requirements contrary to congressional intent). 
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Section 1129(a)(3) requires the debtor’s plan to be “proposed in good faith.”19  
Where the plan is proposed with a legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize 
– a subjective standard – and has a reasonable chance of success – an objective 
standard – the good faith standard is generally satisfied.20  In this Article, the 
author suggests that in SARE cases, a presumption should exist that separate 
classification of deficiency claims from other unsecured claims or impairment 
of de minimis claims for the purpose of achieving confirmation over the 
objection of a creditor is per se bad faith. 
Under this proposed framework, the SARE debtor must overcome the 
presumption of bad faith in its proposed plan of reorganization and justify any 
separate classification of the deficiency claim or demonstrate that the deficiency 
claim is dissimilar from other unsecured claims, rather than waiting for the 
deficiency claimant to object or attack the classification scheme.21  If the debtor 
successfully rebuts the presumption by showing that the deficiency claim was 
not separately classified to gerrymander a consenting class of impaired claims 
or that the deficiency claim is, in fact, legally unalike other unsecured claims, 
the burden shifts to the creditor to demonstrate abuse.22  Likewise, when 
improper impairment is the issue, the debtor must address § 1129(a)(3) directly 
in its proposed plan and overcome a presumption that the impairment of the de 
minimis claim was deliberate and for the sole purpose of achieving a forced 
confirmation over the objection of creditors.23  Similar to the classification issue, 
this presumption can be overcome with evidence showing economic justification 
for such impairment.24  This framework, the author contends, does not operate 
decisively to block reorganization in SARE cases.  Instead, it creates a new 
hurdle for SARE debtors and operates to curtail abuses of the bankruptcy process 
that are prevalent in SARE cases. 
I.  REORGANIZING BUSINESSES 
A.  The Basics and Benefits of Chapter 11 Reorganization 
To understand the classification and impairment issue, one must grasp the 
basics of Chapter 11 reorganization.  Elizabeth Warren notes that: “Businesses 
fail.  Sometimes they collapse in a loud crash.  Sometimes they drift downward, 
like a balloon with a slow leak.  But fast or slow, noisy or quiet, businesses that 
                                                 
 19. § 1129(a)(3). 
 20. See In re Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[D]efining the good faith standard 
in the bankruptcy context as ‘requiring a showing that the plan was proposed ‘honesty and good 
intentions’ and with ‘a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected.’”) (quoting Manati 
Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir. 1935)). 
 21. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Vill. at Camp Bowie, 710 F.3d at 247–48 (analyzing the differences between good 
faith and bad faith presumptions). 
 24. See infra note 79. 
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were once fueled by optimism may someday face their demise.”25  Yet, 
liquidating and selling off a failed business’s assets piecemeal is not always the 
answer.  Salvageable businesses should be rescued or, in some cases, 
resuscitated.  Chapter 11 provides the answer. As the drafters of Chapter 11 put 
it: 
The purpose of a reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to 
restructure a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, 
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return 
for its stockholders.  The premise of a business reorganization is that 
assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were 
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.  
Often, the return on assets that a business can produce is inadequate to 
compensate those who have invested in the business.  Cash flow 
problems may develop and require creditors of the business, both trade 
creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims.  
If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned 
to a viable state.  It is more economically efficient to reorganize than 
to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.26 
The beauty of Chapter 11 is that it allows dying businesses to do things that 
might otherwise be difficult or impossible to achieve outside of Chapter 11.  For 
example, unlike Chapter 7 liquidation, the business debtor in Chapter 11 will 
continue to operate the business and manage its assets as the “debtor in 
                                                 
 25. ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING BUSINESSES 1 (2008). 
 26. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977). Judge Goldberg of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit described the Chapter 11 process in comical and somewhat mystical terms in 
In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 698 F.2d 775, 779–80 (5th Cir. 1983): 
Bankruptcy serves a role in corporate life eerily similar to that of the doctrine of 
reincarnation in some eastern religions.  Bankruptcy is the belief that the souls of a 
corporate entity, the equity-holders, do not just vanish when their corporeal form dies.  
Rather, they learn from the mistakes of a previous incarnation and can once again live on 
the earth in corporate form.  True, they may suffer for the sins of previous incarnations 
and have trouble raising venture capital, but such is the karmic burden.  With luck, 
someday a corporation may achieve enlightenment and reach a plane of eternal bliss and 
nirvana—the Fortune 500. 
Though the relatives of a departed soul may receive intellectual comfort at the thought 
of reincarnation, they are often more touched by the pain and immediacy of their personal 
loss.  Just as it is in life, so it is in bankruptcy.  The close cousins of the equity-holders, 
the debt-holders, take little spiritual comfort from the knowledge that the equity-holders 
may someday be reincorporated.  Instead, they are more aware of the anguish of their 
personal loss, the money they loaned the deceased corporation. 
It is at this point that the black robed judge steps in as the saffron robed monk and 
comforter.  Perhaps the corporation has left behind some small amount of worldly goods, 
some trinkets to remind the debt-holders of their friendship with the departed.  Ah, but 
how to divide the estate so that everyone can have some little item of memorabilia? 
This is a question of great spiritual and temporal import.  Fortunately, the sacred writings 
[of the Bankruptcy Code] can provide guidance and inspiration. 
2018] SARE Manipulation 285 
possession.”27  The operation of the debtor’s business may require the use, sale, 
or lease of property of the debtor’s estate.28  “[A]nd, unless the court orders 
otherwise, the [debtor in possession] may enter into transactions, including the 
sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without 
notice [to creditors] or a hearing” before the bankruptcy judge.29 
Additionally, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays – i.e., 
retrains, prohibits, precludes – any creditor-lender activity or repossessing or 
foreclosing on the debtor’s property.30  Obtaining the protections of the 
automatic stay is often the primary reason for filing a bankruptcy petition, 
particularly for a business that is trying to survive.31  Congress, in enacting the 
Bankruptcy Code, was quite clear as to the purpose of the stay: 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections 
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell 
from his creditors.  It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and 
all foreclosure actions.  It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment 
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial 
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.32 
The stay is also fundamental to other policies underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code: equal distribution to creditors of equal priority and orderly administration 
of the estate.33  The automatic stay is particularly significant in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases because it gives the debtor the chance to formulate a plan to 
present to its creditors for acceptance and approval. 
Chapter 11 also enables the debtor to borrow new funds during the bankruptcy 
case.34  The bankruptcy code “provides certain incentives that a debtor [in 
                                                 
 27. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). 
 28. § 363. 
 29. § 363(c)(1). 
 30. § 362(a). The automatic stay is so named because it becomes effective automatically upon 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 371 (10th Cir. 
1990). The debtor does not have to do anything to make it effective.  Id.  The creditor has the burden 
of moving to get the stay lifted.  Id.  It is no excuse that the creditor did not have notice of the filing 
before the action was taken.  Id.  The action will still be set aside as void.  See e.g., id. (holding 
summary judgment void where entered prior to lifting automatic stay). 
 31. See e.g., id. (noting filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers to protections of an automatic 
stay). 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977). 
 33. See e.g., In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 798–99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (“The stay insures that 
the debtor’s affairs will be centralized, initially, in a single forum in order to prevent conflicting 
judgments from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the creditors’ interests with one 
another.”). 
 34. § 364; see H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (stating that § 364 “governs all obtaining of credit and 
incurring of debt by the estate”); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, ¶ 364.01, at 1 
(“Section 364 now governs all obtaining of credit and incurring of debt by the estate, whether by 
the trustee... or by the debtor in possession....”); 2 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 
39:19 (2011) (“[P]ostpetition financial arrangements are subject to the provisions of Code § 364 
concerning obtaining credit.”). 
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possession] may offer, with court approval, to induce a potential lender” to 
undertake the risks involved in providing post-petition financing to a bankruptcy 
estate.35  “These incentives include granting the lender [when necessary under 
statutorily defined circumstances] an administrative expense priority under § 
364(b), a ‘super-priority’ claim under § 364(c)(1), or a lien on unencumbered 
estate assets under § 364(c)(2) or (3), on account of the post-petition credit 
extended.”36  Further, the Bankruptcy Code provides that, under appropriate 
circumstances and after notice and a hearing, the court may authorize the 
obtaining of credit secured by a lien on encumbered property that is senior or 
equal to any existing lien on the property – often referred to as a “priming lien.”37  
Again, the concept of obtaining credit with its associated incentives is unique to 
the bankruptcy process. 
In addition, Chapter 11 gives the debtor-in-possession the right to assume 
beneficial “executory contracts” and to reject those that might be burdensome, 
“subject to court approval.”38  Contracts that are executory – i.e., contracts with 
material obligations owing on either side – could be one of the main reasons a 
debtor’s business is suffering.39  Take, for example, an energy company that has 
entered into a coal supply contract.  The contract provides that the energy 
company will purchase coal from the coal provider for the next 10 years at 
$50/ton.  The energy company entered into the coal supply contract when coal 
was at $60/ton, so it was considered a good bargain.  Assume, however, that 
within two years of the contract, coal drops to $30/ton. Energy company is 
obligated to keep purchasing coal at what is now an inflated price.  This could 
be detrimental to its business.  Bankruptcy would give energy company, now the 
debtor-in-possession, the power to reject this contract.  On the other hand, if coal 
were now selling for $75/ton, energy company would want this contract to 
remain intact, despite the fact that it might be in breach for failure to pay.  
Chapter 11 would give the energy company power to assume the contract, 
despite the fact that it had breached. 
The “subject to court approval” language was added to the code to “insure that 
the [debtor-in-possession’s assumption of the contract] gives the other 
contracting party the full benefit of his bargain.”40  “The bankruptcy court 
reviews the debtor’s “business judgment” with respect to the proposed 
assumption or rejection to determine if it would be beneficial or burdensome to 
assume or reject the executory contract by evaluating whether assumption or 
rejection would serve the reorganization or whether it would harm other 
                                                 
 35. In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 945 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 36. Id. at 1092–93. 
 37. § 364(d). 
 38. § 365(a). 
 39. See e.g., Sun Runner Marine, 945 F.2d at 1091–92 (finding the business was beginning 
to fail because of an executory contract). 
 40. In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co., 78 F.3d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
98-989, at 59 (1978)). 
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creditors.”41  Where a debtor has defaulted on a contract and the debtor-in-
possession wants to assume the contract, the bankruptcy code also requires that 
a debtor-in-possession at the time of assumption (1) “cure[] or provide[] 
adequate assurance [of] prompt[] cure” of that default; (2) “compensate[] or 
provide adequate assurance [of] prompt[] compensate[ion]”; and (3) “provide[] 
adequate assurance of future performance under [the] contract.”42  In the Chapter 
11 context, the debtor’s plan of reorganization must provide means for “curing 
or waiving any [outstanding] default[s].”43  At the plan confirmation stage, the 
bankruptcy court approves those means.  At confirmation, the bankruptcy court 
also approves the plan “provisions for the assumption, rejection, or assignment 
of any executory contract[s].”44 
Finally, Chapter 11 enables a debtor to develop a debt-restructuring plan that 
will bind all creditors, even those who do not accept it.45 
B.  The Concept of a “Plan” 
Every debtor that commences a voluntary case under Chapter 11 is presumed 
to intend to bring about consensual acceptance and court approval of what is 
called a “plan of reorganization.”46  The word “plan” appears in several places 
in the Bankruptcy Code.47  Section 1103(c)(3), for example, states that one of 
the important duties of a creditor’s committee is to “participate in the 
formulation of a plan.”48  Section 1106(a)(5), moreover, mandates the debtor in 
possession, as soon as practicable after the commencement of the case, to file “a 
plan.”49  And § 1112(b)(4)(J)-(M) authorize dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 
11 case for failure to propose, confirm, or carry out the provisions of “a plan.”50  
The confirmation of a plan is the prime objective of the Chapter 11 case 
evidenced by the judge’s wide discretion to dismiss a case if there is an “inability 
to effectuate a plan.”51  Nonetheless, the idea of “a plan” and “confirmation” of 
the plan can be a nebulous concept for those unfamiliar with bankruptcy law. 
Simply put, “[a] plan of reorganization is a contract which binds a debtor and 
its creditors.”52  The plan tells the creditors what they will receive on account of 
their claims and when and how they will receive it.  As the Second Circuit 
observed, “[t]he plan of reorganization determines how much and in what form 
                                                 
 41. In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 42. § 365(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 43. § 1123(a)(5)(G). 
 44. § 1123(b)(2). 
 45. § 1123(b). 
 46. § 1123(a). 
 47. See generally § 1106 (using the word “plan” repeatedly). 
 48. § 1103(c)(3). 
 49. § 1106(a)(5). 
 50. § 1112(b)(4)(J)–(M). 
 51. § 1112. 
 52. In re Pettibone Corp., 134 B.R. 349, 351–52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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creditors will be paid, whether stockholders will continue to retain any interests, 
and in what form the business will continue.”53  Generally, a plan must be 
accepted by creditors and confirmed by the court in order to become effective.54  
The court held In re Herron that “[o]nce a plan is confirmed, the preconfirmation 
debt is ‘replaced’ with a new indebtedness as provided in the confirmed plan. 
The new indebtedness is in essence a new and binding contract between the 
debtor and the creditors.”55  Furthermore, a confirmed plan “discharges” a debtor 
that continues in business from any pre-confirmation debt.56  Consider the 
following example as illustrative: 
Assume that a plan provides that holders of unsecured claims will 
receive 20 cents on the dollar in six monthly installments in 
satisfaction of their claims.  An unsecured creditor with an allowed 
claim of $10,000, therefore, would only be entitled to $2,000 under 
the plan, spread out over six months (i.e., $333.33/month).  The 
debtor’s remaining liability – the $8,000 deficiency – to the creditor is 
discharged pursuant to Section 1141(d)(1).  Also assume the newly 
reorganized debtor paid the first installment, but defaulted on the 
second.  Could the newly reorganized debtor file suit to recover on the 
original $10,000 claim?  The answer is: no.  The creditor would be 
relegated to the $2,000 reorganized debt and could bring an action 
only to recover the balance owing on the new $2,000 debt.  Thus, 
unlike the common law theories of contract dealing with accord and 
satisfaction, whereby a creditor agrees to accept in full satisfaction 
something less than the amounts of the original claim only when 
performance is rendered, a confirmed plan permanently modifies the 
debtor’s obligations, notwithstanding a subsequent default.57 
Confirmation of the plan is clearly the goal of every debtor in possession.  The 
requirements for confirmation of a proposed Chapter 11 plan are listed in 11 
U.S.C. § 1129.58  The proponent of the plan bears the burden of establishing the 
plan’s compliance with each of these requirements, including the first 
requirement found in § 1129(a)(1), which states that “[t]he plan complies with 
the applicable provisions of this title.”59  The phrase “applicable provisions” is 
not defined.  The legislative history of § 1129(a)(1), however, explains that this 
provision incorporates the requirements of § 1122 and § 1123, which govern 
                                                 
 53. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 54. See § 1129(a). 
 55. In re Herron, 60 B.R. 82, 84 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); see also In re Ernst, 45 B.R. 700, 
702 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (“The plan is essentially a new and binding contract, sanctioned by the 
Court, between the debtor and his preconfirmation creditors.”). 
 56. § 1141(d)(1)(a). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. § 1129(a)(1). 
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classification of claims and interests and the contents of a plan of 
reorganization.60 
C.  Classification of Claims 
Section 1123(a)(1) and (a)(4) mandate, in pertinent part, that “a plan shall – 
designate, subject to [§] 1122 of this title, classes of claims,” and shall “provide 
the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the 
holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment.”61  
The importance of classification of claims is not explicitly set out in the 
Bankruptcy Code, but the purpose is simple: creditors vote for a proposed plan 
of reorganization by class – not in their individual capacity – and the debtor only 
needs one class to accept its plan as a condition to confirmation.  Classification 
of claims, therefore, plays a central role in the formation and confirmation of the 
Chapter 11 plan.62 
Section 1126(c) states that a class is deemed to have accepted a plan if 
creditors constituting more than one-half of the members of the class and 
representing at least two-thirds of the amount of debt owed to that class have 
voted in favor of the plan.63  Because of the importance of voting by classes, the 
debtor and its creditors often fight about the composition of the classes.64  
Obviously, the debtor would like to have unfettered power and full discretion to 
group creditors in a way that increases the likelihood that the majority in each 
class will vote on the plan it proposes.65  This means that the debtor will do 
whatever is possible to isolate unfriendly and dissenting creditors.  These 
creditors, not surprisingly, object to this classification treatment, often referring 
to the debtor’s actions as improper gerrymandering.66 
Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code governs classification of claims.67 
Section 1122(a) requires that a plan “place a claim or an interest in a particular 
class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or 
interests of such class.”68  “Substantially similar” generally means similar in 
                                                 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 412 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 126 (1978); see Kane v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 648–49 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc., 
37 B.R. 141, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 61. § 1123(a)(1), (4). 
 62. See § 1123(a)(1)–(4). 
 63. § 1126(c). 
 64. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, ¶ 1100.01 (discussing the motivations for 
creditor classifications). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See e.g., In re Boston Post Road Ltd. P’ship, 21 F.3d 477, 479 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1109 (1995); In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 821 (1992). 
 67. § 1122. 
 68. § 1122(a). 
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legal nature, character, or effect.69  Thus, when a debtor seeks to confirm a plan 
of reorganization, it must submit to the court that the plan’s classification of 
claims and interest is appropriate under Section 1122.70 
Section 1122(a) speaks only to the types of claims that can be classified 
together, but it does not address the question of whether substantially similar 
claims may be classified separately.71  Nonetheless, § 1122(a) mandates that 
dissimilar claims cannot be placed into the same class.  Thus, “[t]he threshold 
question for [a] bankruptcy court when applying [§] 1122(a) is to determine 
whether the claims are ‘substantially similar.’”72  The Bankruptcy Code, 
however, is silent on how to ascertain whether claims are “substantially similar.”  
Accordingly, the meaning of “substantially similar” is left to the courts.  Courts, 
however, vary in this meaning and there is a “paucity of case law defining what 
constitutes either similarity or substantial similarity of claims.”73  The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, has determined that “bankruptcy court judges must 
evaluate the nature of each claim, i.e., the kind, species, or character of each 
category of claims.”74  The Fifth Circuit holds that “‘substantially similar claims’ 
[are] those which share common priority and rights against the debtor’s estate.”75  
The First Circuit announced a general principle that “all creditors of equal rank 
with claims against the same property should be placed in the same class.”76  
And the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated: 
This [§ 1122] codifies current case law surrounding classification of 
claim and equity securities.  It requires classification based on the 
nature of the claims or interests classified, and permits inclusion of 
claims or interests in a particular class only if the claim or interest 
being included is substantially similar to the other claims or interests 
of the class.77 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of the phrase “substantially 
similar,” § 1122(a) clearly mandates that dissimilar claims may not be placed 
into the same class.78  Thus, if the bankruptcy court determines that the claims 
are not substantially similar, the analysis should end there – the claims must be 
                                                 
 69. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, ¶ 1122.03[3]; see also In re Johnston, 21 F.3d 
323, 327 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 70. § 1123. 
 71. In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 72. In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525, 536 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
 73. In re Loop 76, LLC, 442 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010). 
 74. Johnston, 21 F.3d at 327. 
 75. In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., 632 F.3d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 76. Granada Wines, Inc. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d 
42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 77. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 118 (1978); see also CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A 
GUIDE TO REORGANIZATION § 30.16 (James F. Queenan, Jr. et al eds., 1994) (stating that “[t]hese 
committee reports, like the statute itself, expressly encompass only the requirement of homogeneity 
of claims placed within the same class.”). 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012). 
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separately classified.  If, however, the court finds that the claims are 
substantially similar and the debtor seeks to classify them separately, a few 
approaches have emerged to determine whether this separate classification is 
appropriate. 
A majority of courts say that the plan may place these substantially similar 
claims in different classes if the debtor can show a business or economic 
justification for doing so.79  But absent a business or economic justification, it is 
not enough to justify separate classification of substantially similar claims.  
Indeed, when objections to classification under § 1122(a) arise, courts are 
oftentimes presented with allegations that the plan proponent separately 
classified similar claims only to ensure acceptance by at least one class of 
impaired claims required by § 1129(a)(10), as discussed below.80  Such 
manipulation is viewed as an abuse of Chapter 11.  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has 
held that “one clear rule [has] emerge[d] from [the] otherwise muddled case law 
on § 1122 claims: [T]hou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to 
gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan.”81  Thus, when the 
debtor separately classifies legally similar claims, but can demonstrate “business 
or economic reasons independent of the debtor’s need to secure the acceptance 
of a plan by an impaired accepting class of creditors for purposes of 
confirmation,” the majority approach would allow it.82 
The other approach does not consider a business or economic justification for 
placing substantially similar claims in separate classes.  This approach – referred 
to as the so-called “strict approach” derived from pre-Code Chapter X cases – 
requires all creditors of equal rank with claims against the same property to be 
placed in the same class, regardless of business or economic issues.83  Thus, 
“[s]eparate classification for unsecured creditors, [for example, is] only justified 
where the legal character of their claims is such as to accord them a status 
different from the other unsecured creditors.”84 
                                                 
 79. See Barakt v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Barakat), 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir. 1996).  
“Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that 
a debtor proposing a cramdown plan must show a reason for separately classifying unsecured 
claims other than the need to secure the vote of an impaired class of claims.”  In re CGE Shattuck, 
LLC., Nos. 99–12287–JMD, CM 99–747, 1999 WL 33457789, at *4 (D.N.H. 1999) (citing In re 
Boston Post Road Ltd. P’ship, 21 F.3d 477, 481–83 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 
(1995)); see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 159 (3rd 
Cir.1993); In re Bryson Props. XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 866 
(1992); In re Lumber Exchange Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 968 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1992); In re 
Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279–80 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 821 
(1992)); In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997). 
 80. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at 1278, 1280. 
 81. Phoenix Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 
1991). 
 82. CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789, at *4. 
 83. See In re Barney & Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). 
 84. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Granada Wines, Inc. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking 
Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984)). 
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Clearly, these two approaches are at odds with each other.  Debtors who file 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in circuits that have adopted the flexible 
business/economic justification approach have a much easier path to 
confirmation.  Debtors who file in circuits adopting the strict approach, on the 
other hand, will be required to demonstrate that each class of claims in its plan 
is materially different – i.e., that the legal character or nature of the claims are 
simply not the same.85 
In addition to properly organizing its claims into classes, part of plan 
confirmation requires the debtor to “specify any class of claims or interests that 
is not impaired, . . . [and] specify the treatment of any class of claims or interests 
that is impaired under the plan.”86  Understanding the meaning and import of 
“impairment” is crucial to the development of a confirmable plan of 
reorganization. 
D.  The Accepting Impaired Class 
There are two ways in which a plan of reorganization may be confirmed.  One 
way is that the plan may be agreed to by the affirmative vote of all impaired 
classes – i.e., a consensual plan.87  “This consensual means of plan negotiation 
and confirmation is among the paramount goals of Chapter 11.”88  However, 
[S]hould an impaired class vote against confirmation, all hope is not 
lost, for a plan can be confirmed [– that is, “crammed down” –] over 
the vote of dissenting classes of claims under the cramdown provisions 
of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) if all the requirements of subsection (a) of 
section 1129 are satisfied, excluding (a)(8) [(which requires all 
impaired classes to accept the plan),] and the bankruptcy court is 
satisfied that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and 
equitable with respect to each class of impaired claims that has not 
accepted the plan [– i.e., a nonconsensual plan.]89 
“But the requirement of approval by at least one impaired accepting class (not 
counting the votes of insiders) must be met.”90  Thus, the concept of class 
“impairment” is paramount to confirmation – a debtor always needs an accepting 
impaired class.91 
Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code defines “impairment” in the negative.92  
Under § 1124, “a class of claims or interests is ‘impaired’ under a plan of 
reorganization, unless, with respect to each claim or interest [in the] class, the 
                                                 
 85. See id. 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 87. § 1129(a)(8). 
 88. In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. § 1124. 
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plan leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such 
claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest,” or cures a default 
and leaves such legal, equitable, and contractual rights otherwise unaltered.93  
Thus, by negative implication from the statute’s language, any alteration of the 
pre-petition legal or equitable rights of a creditor, positive or negative, is an 
impairment.94 
“The concept of ‘impairment’ was engrafted into § 1129(a)(10) in 1984 in an 
attempt to engender in the reorganization process a greater degree of consensus 
by mandating the affirmative vote by a class of claimants whose rights were 
altered under a plan of reorganization.”95  This mandatory requirement for plan 
confirmation where at least one accepting class is impaired – that is, that will not 
receive the full value of its claims – has created much controversy. 
Section 1129(a)(10) provides that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the 
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the 
plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.”96  
This section, therefore, is designed to prevent a plan from being confirmed 
unless a class of creditors impaired by such plan support it.97  The Eighth Circuit 
has stated that “[t]he purpose of [Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10)] ‘is to provide 
some indicia of support [for a plan] by affected creditors and prevent 
confirmation where such support is lacking.’”98  “As such, [§] 1129(a)(10) 
requires that a plan of reorganization pass muster in the opinion of creditors 
whose rights to repayment from the debtor are implicated by the 
reorganization.”99  Indeed, “[b]y providing impaired creditors the right to vote 
on confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization 
are monitored by those who have a financial stake in its outcome.”100 
The author believes that two basic principles underlie § 1129(a)(10): fairness 
and judicial efficiency.  The fairness component focuses on what is fair to the 
creditors. Indeed, “before embarking upon the tortuous path of cram down and 
compelling the target of cram down to shoulder the risks of error necessarily 
associated with a forced confirmation, there must be some other properly 
                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. See In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 47 B.R. 932, 940 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985), aff’d, 800 
F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a creditor is unimpaired only if the plan restores the 
creditor to its pre-petition position”); see also In re Elecs. & Metals Industs., Inc., 153 B.R. 36, 38 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992); see also In re Valley Park Group, Inc., 96 B.R. 16, 22 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1989). 
 95. John R. Clemancy & Nancy J. March, Artificial Impairment and the Elusive Accepting 
Impaired Class in Single Asset Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 21 (1993). 
 96. § 1129(a)(10). 
 97. Id. 
 98. In re Windsor on the River Assoc., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting In re 
Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989)). 
 99. In re Combustion Eng’g., Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
 100. Id. 
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classified group that is also hurt and nonetheless favors the plan.”101  Indeed, § 
1129(a)(10) clearly ensures “there must be someone other than the debtor, other 
than the insiders, and other than the target of the cram down, who cares enough 
about the reorganization and whose rights must also be considered to invoke the 
equitable grounds that justify resort to cram down.”102  If fairness were not a 
consideration, § 1129(a)(10) would not expressly exclude the votes of insiders.  
Section 1129(a)(10) mandates that the votes of insiders be omitted from 
calculating plan acceptances, even if the result is an unconfirmable plan.103 
While the impact of this requirement may appear harsh, 
“[t]he exclusion recognizes that where a creditor is under the debtor’s 
proverbial thumb due to the parties’ affinity of interests, that creditor 
is less likely, perhaps even incapable, of casting a vote formed on an 
independent judgment of what will best serve his interests, much less 
those of his fellow class members.”104 
Section 1129(a)(10) also preserves judicial resources: if the debtor fails to 
attain the requisite acceptance from an impaired, non-insider class, then the court 
need consider the plan no further.105  Indeed, “[i]f cramdown is not available, it 
is pointless to further consider a plan which requires cramdown for its 
success.”106  Courts across the board recognize that “a threshold and potentially 
dispositive issue is the . . . hurdle present in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) . . . .”107 
Because § 1129(a)(10) essentially functions as a gatekeeper to confirmation 
by excluding unfair plans with no creditor support, its application is not without 
controversy. 
The seemingly straightforward construction of § 1129(a)(10) belies 
the obstacle it can present in the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization.  Indeed, the generality of § 1129(a)(10) has caused 
bankruptcy courts and federal circuits alike to come to diametrically 
opposed conclusions about the ability of § 1129(a)(10) to scuttle plan 
confirmation.108 
The § 1129(a)(10) battle is even more prevalent in SARE Cases, where a 
primary obstacle to confirmation is simply finding a creditor that favors the plan. 
                                                 
 101. In re 266 Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 102. In re Anderson Oaks (Phase I) Ltd. P’ship., 77 B.R. 108, 112–13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1987). 
 103. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 104. In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 210 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989). 
 105. § 1129(a)(10). 
 106. Anderson Oaks, 77 B.R. at 113. 
 107. In re Duval Manor Assoc., 191 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 108. Carson T. H. Emmons, Construction and Application of 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(10), 
Requiring at Least One Impaired Class to Accept Plan for Confirmation, 4 A.L.R. FED. 3D ART. 3 
(2015). 
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II.  THE SARE DEBTOR AND THE HURDLES 
A.  The SARE Debtor 
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, there was no express 
mention of single asset real estate.109  As such, there was no specific limitation 
on the relief afforded a debtor with a case entirely dependent on one piece of 
real estate.  Congress, however, found a need to curb abusive filings and protect 
secured creditors who were being strung out for long periods of time, having no 
remuneration and no real hope of reorganization by the debtor.110  Accordingly, 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 added provisions to create special treatment 
for debtors with assets constituting “single asset real estate.”111  The Bankruptcy 
Code defines “single asset real estate” as: 
[R]eal property constituting a single property or project, other than 
residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which 
generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not 
a family farmer and on which no substantial business is being 
conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real 
property and activities incidental thereto.112 
Classification of a SARE case is relevant in several respects, particularly 
because of its effect on the operation of the automatic stay of § 362.  If a creditor 
has secured claims in “single asset real estate,” it can obtain relief from the 
                                                 
 109. Cohn, supra note 16, at 525. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did not introduce the 
phrase “single asset real estate” into bankruptcy cognizance.  It is a common term in bankruptcy 
and has been used for many years in the bankruptcy area: 
Single asset Chapter 11 cases have been filed in rapidly increasing numbers in recent 
years. Hit by real estate recessions in the mid–1970’s and mid–1980’s, innumerable 
single asset partnerships and corporations, formed only to acquire and manage their one 
investment asset, have sought the protection of the bankruptcy court.  Often filed with 
little purpose but to postpone foreclosure, and with no serious hope of reorganization, 
single asset cases have met harsh reactions from many courts. 
* * * * * * 
Single asset bankruptcy cases are not new.  They first blossomed under Chapter XII of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was enacted as a part of the Chandler Act in 1938.  
Chapter XII, entitled “Real Property Arrangements by Persons Other Than 
Corporations,” was precipitated by the then-common situation in which an individual or 
partnership owned real estate for which it was obligated on bond issues secured by trust 
indentures and owned by large numbers of individual holders.  Although Chapter XII 
was not limited to “single asset” cases, most debtors who sought its protection owned a 
single parcel of real estate, typically a developed property such as an apartment house or 
office building.  Increasing numbers of such individuals and partnerships found 
themselves unable to pay their bond issues during the depression years of the 1930’s, 
particularly in Chicago and in some northeastern cities.  Chapter XII was designed for 
these individual and partnership debtors. 
Id. at 523–24. 
 110. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, ¶ 362.07[5]. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2012). 
296 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:2 
automatic stay to foreclose on the real estate if the debtor fails to file a plan 
within a shortened amount of time or make specified monthly payments under § 
362(d)(3).113  “The purpose that § 362(d)(3) serves is, where there is a single 
asset real estate Chapter 11 case, to impose an expedited time frame for filing a 
plan.”114  The plan in such a case must be filed within ninety days after the filing 
of the case.115 This requirement is significant in two respects.  “First, it sets a 
time for filing a plan in this species of Chapter 11 case.”116 In fact, “[t]here is no 
time requirement in the Bankruptcy Code for the filing of a plan for any other 
kind of Chapter 11 case.”117  “Second, the consequence of not meeting that 
requirement is that the automatic stay of § 362 may be lifted without ado.”118 
Using the Bankruptcy Code definition, courts have adopted three 
requirements necessary for characterizing a debtor’s case as a SARE case: 
(1) The debtor must have real property constituting a single property 
or project (other than residential real property with fewer than 4 
residential units), (2) which generates substantially all of the gross 
income of the debtor, and (3) on which no substantial business is 
conducted other than the business of operating real property and 
activities incidental thereto.119 
“If a debtor fails to meet any prong, it is not a [single asset real estate 
debtor].”120 
SARE cases share a few other commonalities: “(1) There is usually ‘a single 
secured creditor, which is at war with the debtor and which will not go along 
with any proposal made by the debtor,’ (2) foreclosure on the real property is 
imminent (SARE cases are usually filed on the eve of foreclosure), (3) there 
exists a handful of trade creditors with nominal claims, (4) there is likely ‘a year 
or two of unpaid real property taxes,’ and (5) ‘the secured debt dwarfs the value 
of the real property,’ leaving the secured creditor with a large, unsecured 
deficiency claim.”121 
Because of these commonalities – particularly the large looming deficiency 
claim – the SARE debtor has a critical need to isolate the secured creditor’s 
deficiency claim from the other creditors and then work towards “impairing” its 
friendly class of claims and soliciting their affirmative vote in favor of its plan.122 
                                                 
 113. § 362(d)(3). 
 114. In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47, 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. In re Scotia Pacific Co., LLC, 508 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 101(51B)). 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. Clemancy & Marsh, supra note 95, at 21. 
 122. See id. 
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B.  Classification Maneuvering 
Because a class of claims accepts a plan if more than one-half in number and 
at least two-thirds in amount of claims voting in a class favor the plan,123 a 
debtor’s composition of its classes clearly has a substantial impact upon its 
chances of successfully cramming down a plan.  In SARE cases, it almost always 
behooves the debtor to separately classify the mortgagees’ deficiency claims 
from the other unsecured claims, since the sheer size of a typical deficiency 
claim would generally allow the deficiency claimant to block confirmation by 
controlling the vote of a single unsecured creditor class.124  Under this common 
scenario, there would be no impaired accepting class under § 1129(a)(10) and 
the SARE debtor would be barred from confirming its plan.  Consider the 
following example: 
Big Bank (Bank) makes a $6 million loan to D&M Developments, LLC 
(D&M), secured by a first mortgage on an office complex, which is D&M’s sole 
asset.  The office complex generates all of D&M’s income.  D&M is unable to 
service the debt and defaults under the loan.  Bank schedules a foreclosure sale.  
On the eve of the scheduled sale, D&M files for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code, and designates its filing as a SARE case.  At that time, 
general unsecured trade creditors are owed $100,000.  D&M paid down the loan 
by $1 million before it defaulted, so the principal balance at filing was $5 
million.  D&M (now the debtor-in-possession) wants to file a plan of 
reorganization where it will retain the property, pay general unsecured trade 
creditors 90% of their claims on the effective date of the plan, without interest, 
and restructure the $5 million balance into a new note with more favorable terms.  
But the $5 million secured claim really might not be a fully secured claim under 
bankruptcy law, which will affect how the debtor structures its plan. 
Assume the value of the property is $3 million.  Under § 506(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, this gives Bank a bifurcated claim in D&M’s bankruptcy 
case, since a lender’s secured claim is limited to the value of its collateral and 
any difference between the amount of the debt and the value of the collateral, 
that is, the deficiency, is deemed an unsecured claim.  Thus, in this example, 
Bank’s claim against the estate would be treated as follows: (1) a secured claim 
of $3 million (i.e., the value of the property) and (2) an unsecured claim of $2 
million (i.e., the deficiency).  Under the Bankruptcy Code, these are considered 
separate claims and will be placed in separate classes because they are in no way 
substantially similar.125  D&M has two options for classification: 
                                                 
 123. § 1126(c). 
 124. James Lawniczak, Separate Classification of Deficiency Claims in Chapter 11 Plans, 
LEXISNEXIS (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/bankruptcy/b/bankruptcy-
law-blog/archive/2012/10/31/separate-classification-of-deficiency-claims-in-chapter-11-plans.as 
px. 
 125. See In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525, 536 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
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Option 1:126 
Class 1: Bank’s Secured Claim: $3 million 
Class 2: Unsecured Claims: $2,100,000 (i.e., $2 million deficiency + 
$100,000 trade) 
Option 2:127 
Class 1: Bank’s Secured Claim: $3 million 
Class 2: Bank’s Unsecured Claim: $2 million 
Class 3: Trade Creditors: $100,000 
D&M will never go with Option 1 if the Bank makes it known that it will vote 
against its plan both in its capacity as a secured creditor and as an unsecured 
creditor.  D&M will also not find Option 1 attractive if it promised to pay that 
class 90% of their claims, since it will be required to provide the Bank’s 
deficiency claim with the same treatment as the other claims in that class.128  
More importantly, however, is that under Option 1, the Bank’s unsecured 
deficiency claim will swamp Class 2, making it impossible for Class 2 to meet 
the one-half in number and at least two-thirds in amount requirement for an 
accepting class.  Thus, Option 2 is really the only option available for D&M. 
Under Option 2, however, Class 1 and Class 2 can reject the plan, but now 
Class 3 can accept it.  Class 3 is likely to accept the plan since they are being 
paid nearly in full.  If this separate classification is proper, the trade creditors 
will constitute the needed impaired accepting class necessary to satisfy § 
1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code.  In other words, the class representing 2% 
of D&M debt will determine whether the plan gets confirmed. 
Based on this simple example, it is not surprising that the SARE debtor 
searches for ways to flexibly classify the deficiency claim, a flexibility which is 
vital to the effort to reorganize.  The following cases are illustrative: 
1.  The Classification Loophole in In re Loop 76, LLC 
In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In re Loop 76, LLC),129 the Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a bankruptcy court may consider 
a third-party source (a guarantor) for recovery on a creditor’s unsecured 
deficiency claim when determining whether claims are “substantially similar” 
under § 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, thus justifying a debtor’s classification 
of the deficiency claim separate from the claims of other unsecured creditors.130 
                                                 
 126. See James Lawniczak, Separate Classification of Deficiency Claims in Chapter 11 Plans, 
LEXISNEXIS (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:23 PM), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/bankruptcy/ 
b/bankruptcy-law-blog/archive/2012/10/31/separate-classification-of-deficiency-claims-in-chapte 
r-11-plans.aspx. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See § 1123(a)(4). 
 129. Loop 76, LLC., 465 B.R. at 525. 
 130. Id. at 528. 
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The facts of In re Loop are rather simple.  In re Loop was a SARE case that 
involved an undersecured lender.  Loop 66’s sole asset was an office/retail 
complex.131  Wells Fargo had provided Loop 66 with a $23 million construction 
loan, which was secured by the office complex, and which was also personally 
guaranteed by Loop 66’s members.132  For voting purposes, Wells Fargo and the 
debtor stipulated that the value of the office complex was $17 million, giving 
Wells Fargo a bifurcated claim against the estate pursuant to § 506(a): (1) a 
secured claim for $17 million and (2) an unsecured deficiency claim for $6 
million.133 
The debtor’s plan placed Wells Fargo’s secured claim in Class 2, and its 
deficiency claim in Class 8(B).134  All of the other unsecured claims were placed 
in Class 8(A).135  This separate classification allowed the debtor to obtain the 
requisite impaired accepting class pursuant to § 1129(a)(10).136  If Wells Fargo’s 
deficiency claim had been placed in Class 8(A) along with all other general 
unsecured claims, it would have prevented the debtor’s plan from being 
confirmed. 
Wells Fargo objected to the separate classification of its deficiency claim, 
arguing that its claim was “substantially similar” to all other general unsecured 
claims pursuant to § 1122(a) and, therefore, separate classification was 
impermissible.137  The debtor, on the other hand, argued that Wells Fargo’s 
deficiency claim was dissimilar because it had potential recovery against third-
party guarantors.138  This, the debtor argued, rendered Wells Fargo’s unsecured 
claim different in legal character as compared to Class 8(A) general unsecured 
claims, allowing for separate classification.139 
The bankruptcy court agreed with the debtor.140  It held that “a claimant with 
a third-party source of repayment for its claim is dissimilar from a claimant who 
lacks such [an] alternative source[] of [recovery].”141  Accordingly, the 
bankruptcy court overruled Wells Fargo’s objection and confirmed the plan.142 
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s ruling.143  It agreed that possessing a separate course of recovery is 
something different and distinct from other unsecured creditors with no similar 
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source.144  Under its ruling, the court stated that bankruptcy courts should not be 
limited to determining the “nature” of a claim’s relation to the “assets of the 
debtor,” but that considering third-party sources of recovery is an appropriate 
way to analyze the similarity of claims.145  Wells Fargo’s pending lawsuit 
against the guarantors, opined the court, rendered its unsecured deficiency 
claims distinct from the debtor’s other unsecured claims.146 
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in In re Loop is at odds with other 
cases, which hold that “the existence of a third-party guarantee does not change 
the nature of a claim with respect to the debtor’s estate.”147  Creditors should be 
aware that, depending on the jurisdiction, plans with similar classification 
schemes may have substantially dissimilar outcomes.  A debtor’s ability to 
classify claims separately based on a third-party guaranty is arguably a loophole 
which Congress did not intend to create. 
If a guarantor is absent in the debtor’s case or the debtor is otherwise unable 
to use the guarantor argument as way to manufacture its classes, it has another 
classification loophole to explore.  This loophole necessitates examination of § 
506(a) and § 1111(b). 
2.  The Classification Loophole in Non-Recourse Cases 
In the example above involving D&M, it is obvious, given the size of Bank’s 
deficiency claim relative to the other unsecured claims and its opposition to 
D&M’s plan, why D&M needs to separately classify the Bank’s deficiency 
claim: it must satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a)(10) and get at least one 
impaired class to accept the plan.148  In this example, a finding by a court that 
joint classification is necessary would be the death knell for D&M’s plan 
because it could not satisfy the requirements of § 1129(a)(10) and because Bank 
refuses to accept its plan. But assume that the loan the Bank made to D&M is 
nonrecourse – i.e., its recovery for default is limited to the real property pledged 
by D&M. Does this fact provide D&M with an additional loophole to argue 
separate classification is appropriate? The answer is: yes. 
Because a claim in bankruptcy is secured only to the extent of the judicially 
determined value of the collateral, § 506(a), in effect, bifurcates an otherwise 
secured claim into a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an 
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unsecured claim for any deficiency, even if under state law the creditor’s claim 
is nonrecourse.149  “Under [§] 1111(b)(1)(A), non-recourse claims secured by 
liens on property of the estate . . . are treated as though they were recourse 
claims, with the claimant having an unsecured claim against the debtor to the 
extent of a deficiency.”150  The class holding such claims is given an option: it 
may retain this recourse treatment or make the § 1111(b)(2) election pursuant to 
which each claim in the class is considered fully secured, despite the value of 
the collateral being less than the claim.151 
Assume Bank chooses to bifurcate its claim.  The classification scheme will 
be identical to that discussed previously, despite the fact that it is a nonrecourse 
loan.  It will have a secured claim of $3 million (i.e., the value of the property) 
and (2) an unsecured claim of $2 million (i.e., the deficiency).  But now D&M 
has a new quiver in its arrow – one, in fact, that it would not have if the loan 
were recourse – to help it classify the bank’s deficiency claim separately. 
Debtor will argue that unsecured deficiency claims created by § 1111(b) are 
not substantially similar to general unsecured claims and, therefore, separate 
classification is mandatory.  Courts that support this argument contend that “the 
most obvious difference between a general unsecured claim and an unsecured 
[deficiency] claim created by § 1111(b) is that the former exists regardless of 
what chapter of the Bankruptcy Code the case is in, while the latter exists only 
so long as the case remains in Chapter 11.”152  In the abstract, this is true.  If the 
Chapter 11 case is converted to Chapter 7, the nonrecourse lender is confined to 
its collateral for recovery and has no deficiency claim against the Chapter 7 
estate.153  This is also true if the bankruptcy case is dismissed.  But is this 
difference material enough to make these claims dissimilar?  Another argument 
courts make in favor of this position is “that [a creditor’s] secured claim may 
drive the manner in which it casts its unsecured deficiency claim ([perhaps 
causing] it to cast its unsecured vote in a manner that has nothing to do with its 
best interest as an unsecured creditor)” and, therefore, separate classification is 
proper.154 
Other courts do not agree with this approach, holding that unsecured claims 
and deficiency claims – regardless of their nonrecourse character – are 
substantially similar.155  “Since these are creditors of equal rank with equal rights 
within chapter 11, . . . they should be classified together.”156  Moreover, courts 
reject the voting-motive theory since it “focuses on the motives and agenda of 
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the claim holder rather than on the nature of the underlying claim.”157  
Notwithstanding,  this classification loophole has created a split of authority and 
creditors should be aware that, depending on the jurisdiction, plans with similar 
classification schemes may have substantially dissimilar outcomes.158 
C.  Artificial Impairment 
Inventive and manipulative classification is not the only loophole SARE 
debtors are utilizing to confirm plans.  Even if classification is proper – i.e., even 
if the debtor is allowed to classify separately the lender’s deficiency claim from 
other general unsecured claims – the debtor still must have at least one 
“impaired” class accepting the plan pursuant to § 1129(a)(10).159  This condition 
to confirmation requires further creativity for the SARE debtor. 
In the D&M hypothetical, assume that D&M is allowed to separately classify 
Bank’s deficiency claim of $2 million from the trade creditors’ claims of 
$100,000.  On the effective date of the plan, the debtor proposes to pay trade 
creditors’ 90% of their claims – i.e., $90,000 – and without interest.  Why would 
D&M not pay the trade creditors $100,000 with interest? The answer is simple.  
If D&M offered full payment with interest, the trade creditor class would not be 
“impaired” and, therefore, the § 1129(a)(10) requirement would not be met.  
Assume D&M has sufficient funds to pay trade creditors in full on the effective 
date, but has deliberately chosen the 10% haircut to obtain its impaired accepting 
class for confirmation.  Is this scheme allowed?  Several courts, practitioners, 
and scholars refer to this impairment manipulation as “artificial impairment” and 
are split on whether it runs afoul of § 1129(a)(10).160 
The Bankruptcy Code presumes that a class of claims is “impaired” under a 
plan unless a specific exception applies.161  One exception to the presumption of 
impairment arises where the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and 
contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim 
or interest.”162  Several courts have found that “Congress defined impairment in 
the broadest possible terms.”163  The bankruptcy court found “impairment 
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apparently can be of nominal financial significance, since Congress rejected the 
Commission’s recommendation that impairment be deemed to exist only if the 
class is material and adversely affected.”164 
Artificial impairment generally refers to “[t]he manipulation of classes of 
claims in order to artificially create an accepting class of impaired claims.”165  
Courts, scholars and practitioners oftentimes confuse artificial impairment with 
what is described above as “artificial classification” – i.e., a debtor’s attempt to 
separate classes of claims/creditors who otherwise could have been grouped into 
one class, purely for the purpose of creating an accepting class to support the 
Chapter 11 plan.166  But the proper use of the term “artificial impairment” refers 
to a scenario “where a debtor deliberately ‘impairs a de minimis claim’ solely 
for the purpose of achieving a forced confirmation over the objection of a 
creditor.”167 
One of the leading cases criticizing artificial impairment is Windsor on the 
River Associates v. Balcor Real Estate Finance.168  In that case, the debtor 
owned an apartment complex that secured a $9.35 million mortgage and note 
held by Balcor, the only secured creditor.169  The debtor also owed debts to one 
individual amounting to approximately $59,000 in addition to $13,000 owed to 
34 trade creditors.170  When the debtor filed its plan, these became Classes 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively.171  Class 1 was impaired because the plan extended the term 
of the note from four to ten years, with a cash payment of $500,000 on the plan’s 
effective date.172  Classes 2 and 3 were allegedly impaired because these classes 
would not be paid in full until 60 days after the plan’s effective date.173  Despite 
Balcor holding over 99% of the money value of the creditors’ claims, the District 
Court approved the plan because Class 3 (as the “impaired” non-insider class) 
accepted the plan.174 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that “a claim is not impaired [for purposes 
of the 1129(a)(10) requirement] if the alteration of the rights in question arises 
solely from the debtor’s exercise of discretion.”175  Under the Eighth Circuit’s 
                                                 
 164. In re 28th Legislative Dist. Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. 10–14804, 2011 WL 5509140, at *32 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011) (quoting 6 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 113:5 
(2011)). 
 165. In re Griswold Bldg., LLC., 420 B.R. 666, 707 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009); see also In re 
Trenton Ridge Investors, LLC, 461 B.R. 440, 464–65 (Banks. S.D. Ohio 2011). 
 166. See Clemancy & Marsh, supra note 95, at 21. 
 167. In re Swartville, LLC., No. 11-08676-8-SWH, 2012 WL 3564171, at *2 (quoting In re 
Dunes Hotel Assocs., 188 B.R. 174, 184 (Bankr. S.C. 1995)). 
 168. In re Windsor on the River Assoc., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 131–32 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 169. Id. at 129. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 129–30. 
 173. Id. at 129. 
 174. Id. at 130. 
 175. Id. at 132. 
304 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:2 
approach, § 1129(a)(10) recognizes impairment only to the extent it is driven by 
some economic “need.”176 
Several courts have followed Windsor on the River – although not necessarily 
adopting its reasoning – and have denied confirmation of Chapter 11 plans 
impairing de minimis claims of some creditors for the purpose of contriving a 
class to accept the plan.177  These courts reasoned that allowing this kind of 
manipulation undermines the policy of consensual reorganization expressed in 
§ 1129(a)(10).178  Indeed, the Eighth Circuit stated “[t]he purpose of [§ 
1129(a)(10)] ‘is to provide some indicia of support [for a plan] by affected 
creditors and prevent confirmation where such support is lacking.’”179 
Other courts, however, including the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that 
artificial impairment does not “run afoul” of § 1129(a)(10).180 In In re L & J 
Anaheim Associates,181 the Ninth Circuit held that § 1129(a)(10) does not 
distinguish between discretionary and economically driven impairment, 
observing that “the plain language of [§] 1124 says that a creditor’s claim is 
‘impaired’ unless its rights are left ‘unaltered’ by the [p]lan,” and that “[t]here 
is no suggestion here that only alternations of a particular kind or degree can 
constitute impairment.”182 
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.,183 
“expressly reject[ed] Windsor and join[ed] the Ninth Circuit in holding that [§] 
1129(a)(10) does not distinguish between discretionary and economically driven 
impairment.”184  It held that “[b]y shoehorning a motive inquiry and materiality 
requirement into § 1129(a)(10), Windsor warps the text of the Code, requiring a 
court to “deem” a claim unimpaired for purposes of § 1129(a)(10) even though 
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it plainly qualifies as impaired under § 1124.”185  The court further held that 
“Windsor’s motive inquiry is also inconsistent with § 1123(b)(1), which 
provides that a plan proponent ‘may impair or leave unimpaired any class of 
claim,’ and does not contain any indication that impairment must be driven by 
economic motives.”186  Regarding Windsor’s pronouncement that “Congress 
enacted [§] 1129(a)(10) . . . to provide some indicia of support [for a cramdown 
plan] by affected creditors” and that “interpreting [§] 1124 literally would vitiate 
this congressional purpose”, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the Bankruptcy Code 
must be read literally, and congressional intent is relevant only when the 
statutory language is ambiguous.”187  In support of this position, it stated that 
even if it were to consider congressional intent in divining the meaning of § 
1129(a)(10) and § 1124, “the scant legislative history on § 1129(a)(10) provides 
virtually no insight as to the provision’s intended role, and the Congress that 
passed § 1124 considered and rejected precisely the sort of materiality 
requirement that Windsor has imposed by judicial fiat.”188  The last critique 
offered by the Fifth Circuit is that Windsor “ignores the determinative role § 
1129(a)(10) plays in the typical single-asset bankruptcy, in which the debtor has 
a negative equity and the secured creditor receives a deficiency claim that allows 
it to control the vote of the unsecured class.”189 
In short, much like the classification issue, courts split on the role that § 
1129(a)(10) and the impairment requirement play in Chapter 11 cases.190  A 
uniform approach to this issue is wanted. 
III.  IMPROPER CLASSIFICATION AND ARTIFICIAL IMPAIRMENT UNDER A 
GOOD-FAITH APPROACH 
Improper classification and artificial impairment are often most apparent in 
single asset real estate cases.  Courts, practitioners, and scholars are continuously 
at odds over the meaning of the code provisions that govern the concepts of 
classification and impairment.  The current approaches for dealing with these 
sections, particularly in single asset real estate cases, yield confusion and 
actually make the reorganization process needlessly complex, costly, and 
unpredictable.  Even more problematic is that the muddle surrounding these code 
provisions is resulting in decisions which are contrary to the congressional intent 
behind the Chapter 11 reorganization process.191  But courts do not need to 
construe these code sections in order to make a determination of the improper 
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classification and artificial impairment issues.  Rather, improper classification 
and artificial impairment should go to a debtor’s good faith in proposing a plan 
under § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code – i.e., improper classification and 
artificial impairment should be nothing more than subdivisions of the good-faith 
requirement mandated by the Bankruptcy Code. 
A.  The Meaning of Good-Faith in Chapter 11 
Pursuant to § 1129(a)(3), the party seeking confirmation must show that “[t]he 
plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”192  
“Good faith” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code; however, as explained by 
the Seventh Circuit: 
Though the term “good faith,” as used in [§] 1129(a)(3), is not defined 
in the Bankruptcy Code, the term is generally interpreted to mean that 
there exists “a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result 
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” 
. . . Thus, for purposes of determining good faith under [§] 1129(a)(3) 
. . . the important point of inquiry is the plan itself and whether such 
plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.193 
The good faith standard found in “[§] 1129(a)(3) speaks more to the process 
of plan development than to the content of the plan.”194  When considering the 
good faith intentions of a Chapter 11 plan, the court looks to the circumstances 
surrounding the plan’s development including the debtor’s pre-filing conduct.195  
The review of a plan’s development allows “a court considerable discretion in 
finding good faith.”196  Moreover, “the bankruptcy court[s] [are] in the best 
position to [ascertain] the good faith of the parties’ proposals.”197  
Notwithstanding, “the fact that a debtor proposes a plan in which it avails itself 
of an applicable Code provision does not constitute evidence of bad faith.”198 
In short, “the important point of inquiry is the plan itself and whether such 
plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of 
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the Bankruptcy Code.”199   The additional factors courts have considered in 
determining a debtor’s good faith include whether “the plan has been proposed 
with honesty and good intentions and with a basis for expecting that 
reorganization can be effected, and [exhibits a] fundamental fairness in dealing 
with the creditors.”200 
Regarding the first factor, the United States Supreme Court has specifically 
identified “preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to 
satisfy creditors” as “the two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11.”201 
The second factor requires that the plan have been proposed with honesty and 
good intentions, and that it have “a reasonable hope of success.”202  The Third 
Circuit has provided guidance on this point, stating that, “[a]t its most 
fundamental level, the good faith requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy 
Code’s careful balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose 
aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.”203  In analyzing 
whether a debtor’s plan has been proposed for honest and good reasons, courts 
regularly consider “whether the debtor intended to abuse the judicial process,” 
whether the plan was proposed for ulterior motives, or if “no realistic possibility 
for effective reorganization exists.”204 
The third and final factor courts consider when considering a debtor’s good 
faith is if the debtor exhibited a fundamental unfairness when dealing with its 
creditors.  In order to comply with this requirement, the plan “must treat all 
interested parties fairly and . . .efforts used to confirm the plan must comport 
with due process.”205 
For SARE cases, the Eleventh Circuit has enumerated the following factors 
as indicative of bad faith: 
(1) The debtor has only one asset, the Property, in which it does not 
hold legal title; 
(2) The debtor has few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in 
relation to the claims of the Secured Creditors; 
(3) The Debtor has few employees; 
(4) The Property is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of 
arrearages on the debt; 
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(5) The Debtor’s financial problems involve essentially a dispute 
between the Debtor and the Secured Creditors which can be resolved 
in the pending State Court Action [if any]; and 
(6) The timing of the Debtor’s filing evidences an intent to delay or 
frustrate the legitimate efforts of the Debtor’s secured creditors to 
enforce their rights.206 
The above factors are not exhaustive, and no single factor is determinative.207  
A Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Georgia has proposed a more 
extensive list of factors to consider in determining whether a petition was filed 
in good faith: 
(1) Whether the debtor has few or no unsecured creditors; 
(2) Whether there has been a previous bankruptcy petition by the 
debtor or a related entity; 
(3) Whether the pre-petition conduct of the debtor has been improper; 
(4) Whether the petition effectively allows the debtor to evade court 
orders; 
(5) Whether there are few debts to non-moving creditors; 
(6) Whether the petition was filed on the eve of foreclosure; 
(7) Whether the foreclosed property is the sole or major asset of the 
debtor; 
(8) Whether the debtor has no ongoing business or employees; 
(9) Whether there is no possibility of reorganization; 
(10) Whether the debtor’s income is not sufficient to operate; 
(11) Whether there was no pressure from non-moving creditors; 
(12) Whether reorganization essentially involves the resolution of a 
two-party dispute; 
(13) Whether a corporate debtor was formed and received title to its 
major assets immediately before the petition; and 
(14) Whether the debtor filed solely to create the automatic stay.208 
Many of these factors will be present in SARE cases.  A majority of SARE 
cases have only a few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in relation to 
the claims of the secured creditor (i.e., the mortgagee).209  Most SARE debtors 
only have a few employees.  SARE debtors often file cases days before the 
mortgagee’s scheduled foreclosure on the real property.  These factors will likely 
taint the reorganization proposal of a SARE debtor and may be enough to cause 
the proposed plan to fail the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3). 
                                                 
 206. In re Phoenix Piccadilly Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 207. Id. at 1394. 
 208. Nw. Place, Ltd. v. Cooper, 73 B.R. 978, 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). 
 209. Cohn, supra note 16, at 527. 
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When it comes to classification and impairment issues, particularly in SARE 
cases, courts should focus their attention on the good-faith requirement set forth 
in the Bankruptcy Code. 
B.  Classification and Good Faith 
Section 1122(a) expressly provides that only substantially similar claims may 
be placed in the same class.210  It does not, however, expressly require that all 
substantially similar claims be placed in the same class, nor does it expressly 
prohibit substantially similar claims from being classified separately.  Several 
courts, however, hold that § 1122 “must contemplate some limits on 
classification of claims of similar [rights].”211  This creates complexity and 
unpredictability. 
Courts should consider avoiding the statutory construction of section 1122, 
and instead turn more towards notions of basic fairness and good faith.  Most 
courts agree that separate classification of substantially similar claims is usually 
done to ensure that at least one impaired class of creditors accepts the plan.212  
When this occurs, this manipulation should be viewed as an abuse of Chapter 
11, thereby invoking the good-faith analysis of § 1129(a)(3), not an analysis and 
construction of § 1122.  Under a good-faith approach, for example, separate 
classification of an unsecured deficiency claim created by § 1111(b) from 
general unsecured claims solely to create an accepting creditor class would 
likely be impermissible under § 1129(a)(3), but arguably not under 1122(a).  
Indeed, several courts have held that unsecured deficiency claims created by § 
1111(b) are substantially similar to general unsecured claims, while other courts 
reject this conclusion and have held that these claims are not substantially similar 
to other unsecured claims, and thus separate classification of those claims is not 
only permissible, but mandatory.213 
Sorting out the validity of the various lines of reasoning for separation of 
substantially similar claims is futile because § 1122 is not ambiguous.  As one 
judge observed: “[§] 1122 allows a claim or interest to be placed in a particular 
class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or 
interests of such class.  It does not require that similar classes be grouped 
together but merely that any group be homogenous.”214  The legislative history 
of § 1122 arguably creates confusion about creative or manipulative 
                                                 
 210. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012). 
 211. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1278–79 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 821 (1992); see also In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 216 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 212. See Emmons, supra note 108, § 2. 
 213. See e.g., SM 104 Ltd. 160 B.R. at 221 (holding that deficiency claims created by § 1111(b) 
were required to be classified separately under § 1122(a)); Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at 
1280 (noting the high likelihood of detrimental effect on parties making deficiency claims); In re 
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classification because § 1122 purported to be a codification of existing case law 
and pre-code case law was inconsistent.  However, a straightforward reading of 
§ 1122 should settle any debate.  Some judges agree: 
“[A] plan proponent under § 1122: 
(1) may have the flexibility to place claims of a similar nature in 
different classes; and 
(2) may not place claims of a dissimilar nature in the same class.”215 
The author agrees with this reasoning simply because the statute is 
unambiguous.  The real issue, in the author’s opinion, always becomes one of 
good faith – i.e., has the debtor demonstrated that the separate classification of 
substantially similar claims is in good faith.  These created classes should be 
heavily scrutinized to prevent abuse. But to be clear: creation of separate classes 
of substantially similar claims is not an abuse of the classification systems under 
section 1122.  Rather, it goes to the heart of the good-faith analysis under § 
1129(a)(3). 
If a creditor objects to the classification scheme on gerrymandering grounds, 
most courts require the plan proponent to justify the classification.216  The author 
agrees the plan proponent should justify the classification, but thinks the order 
prescribed by courts is backwards, particularly in SARE cases.  Why is the onus 
on the creditor to point out the debtor’s improper classification attempt?  The 
author believes courts should require SARE debtors to articulate in their 
proposed plans why deficiency claimants are not being grouped with other 
unsecured creditors.  In other words, the author would push for a presumption 
in SARE cases that when a SARE debtor separately classifies unsecured 
deficiency claims – whether created by § 1111(b) or otherwise – it is not 
exhibiting a fundamental fairness in dealing with creditors as required by § 
1129(a)(3).  Under this approach, the SARE debtor must overcome the 
presumption of bad faith and justify any separate classification of deficiency 
                                                 
 215. Id.; see also In re City of Colo. Springs Spring Creek General Imp. Dist., 187 B.R. 683, 
687 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995). 
The express language of § 1122 imposes only one requirement—that claims in a given 
class be substantially similar to each other.  There is no requirement that all substantially 
similar claims be placed in the same class nor is there a prohibition against classifying 
substantially similar claims separately.  Almost all courts interpreting § 1122(a) 
recognize that it does not prohibit separate classification of similar claims, yet many 
courts . . . have augmented § 1122(a) to impose restrictions on a plan proponent’s ability 
to separate similar claims.). 
Id. 
 216. See Dean, 166 B.R. 949, 952 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1994) (debtor must demonstrate reasons 
apart from gerrymandering to separately classify); In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997) (business or economic justification required); In re 
Tucson Self–Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 898 (9th Cir. 1994) (placed justification burden on 
debtor); In re Heritage Org., LLC, 375 B.R. 230, 303–04 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (discussing 
when separate classification justified); see also City of Colo. Spring Creek, 187 B.R. at 688, n. 
4 (collecting cases). 
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claims from unsecured claims.  If the debtor rebuts the presumption by showing 
either (i) that the claims are not substantially similar, or (ii) even if they are 
substantially similar claims, that they were not separately classified to 
gerrymander a consenting class of impaired claims, the burden shifts to the 
creditor to show abuse.  Analyzing separate classification issues in this way 
protects creditors from gerrymandering and other improper classification 
attempts, while avoiding the squabbling over the meaning of the text of § 
1122(a).  It also makes the confirmation process more efficient.  In most cases, 
if the debtor separately classifies the deficiency claim from other unsecured 
claims, the deficiency claimant is going to file a motion objecting to the 
classification scheme.217  This motion will be followed by the debtor’s 
opposition brief. And the opposition brief will be followed by the deficiency 
claimant’s reply brief.  Requiring the debtor to rationalize the separate 
classification of the deficiency claim in the plan may avoid additional filings and 
hearings on the matters. 
Of course, justifying separate classification of deficiency claims from general 
unsecured claims or proving that such claims are dissimilar is not an easy task.  
This Article does not suggest a uniform approach for scrutinizing the debtor’s 
explanations or rationales for separate classification.  It simply suggests that 
good faith is the proper inquiry and a presumption of bad faith should exist in 
SARE cases where the debtor separates deficiency claims from general 
unsecured claims.  However, in determining whether separate classification is 
proper, courts could consider a few justifications or theories that the debtor 
would be required to set forth in its plan. 
First, a court may consider whether a “legitimate business reason” exists for 
separately classifying the deficiency claim.218 For example, a SARE debtor may 
have a strong reason to place a contentious deficiency claimant in one class 
separate from trade creditors.  The routine extension of monthly services and 
supplies by a group of trade creditors might be essential to the debtor’s 
reorganization efforts and ultimately to the survival and continuation of the 
debtor’s business. Trade creditors may also benefit from a continuing 
relationship with the debtor.  The same may not be true for an unsecured 
deficiency claimant.  In In re Richard Buick, Inc.,219 a car dealership’s plan 
proposed to pay its dealer-trader claims in full while its other general unsecured 
claims would receive a five percent distribution on their claims.  The court found 
that there was sufficient justification to segregate the dealer claims and offer 
them superior treatment: 
[The witnesses] testified without rebuttal that full payment of dealer-
trade claims was absolutely necessary to the future success of the 
                                                 
 217. Dean, 166 B.R. at 952; see e.g., Tucson Self–Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. at 895 
(Merabank/RTC filed an objection to the classification plan). 
 218. Barakat, 99 F.3d at 1525. 
 219. In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). 
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Debtor’s business.  Not only was it needed to re-establish a good 
relationship with other dealers whose trades would supply a large 
percentage of the vehicles sold, but also this treatment was needed 
because both of the franchisees willing to resume a relationship with 
the Debtor, i.e., Buick and Volvo, had made full payment of dealer-
trade claims a prerequisite of their continuing respective future 
relationships with the Debtor.  Therefore, the Debtor had good reason 
for allowing the degree of favorable treatment allotted to these 
parties.220 
In In re Georgetown Ltd. Partnership,221 the court concluded that the separate 
classification of an undersecured lender’s deficiency claim from the claims of 
trade creditors was appropriate because it was a significantly larger claim and 
would have to be repaid over a longer period of time.222  Additionally, the court 
found that the debtor intended to have a continuing relationship with its trade 
creditors but not the lender.223 
Second, the debtor may be able to point to differing interests in the plan.  Some 
creditors, such as deficiency claimants, may have different interests in plans 
from other unsecured creditors.  This type of interest has been referred to as 
“non-creditor interests” and a number of courts allow for separate 
classification.224  Indeed, “[a] non-creditor interest can justify separate 
classification if it gives [the creditor] a different stake in the future viability of 
[the debtor] that may cause it to vote for reasons other than its economic interest 
in the claim.”225 
Lastly, the debtor could attempt to articulate why the deficiency claim is 
legally dissimilar from general unsecured claims – i.e., why the Bankruptcy 
Code mandates their separateness.  This approach, however, is highly 
unpredictable given the strong split amongst the courts.226  If the SARE debtor 
files its Chapter 11 case in the Ninth Circuit, for example, and the mortgagee 
has a third-party source of recovery for its claim (i.e., from a guarantor), the 
SARE debtor may be able to overcome the presumption by simply articulating 
in its plan, and citing to In re Loop, that such claims are dissimilar.227  This, 
alone, could rebut the bad-faith presumption, as the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
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 223. Id. at 772 
 224. Id. at 771–72. 
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for the Ninth Circuit holds that possessing a separate course of recovery is 
something different and distinct from other unsecured creditors with no similar 
source.228  Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, there would be no hurdle to overcome 
regarding separate classification of substantially similar claims, since these 
deficiency claimants with third-party sources of recovery are, by judicial 
precedent, legally dissimilar.  Without a guarantor in the mix, however, the 
debtor would be required to articulate a legitimate business reason or non-
creditor interest rationale for the separate classification.229 
Similarly, where the unsecured deficiency claim was created by § 1111(b) 
(i.e., a non-recourse deficiency claim), a SARE debtor may be able to overcome 
the bad-faith presumption by arguing that unsecured deficiency claims created 
by § 1111(b) are not substantially similar to general unsecured claims and, 
therefore, separate classification is mandatory.230  Some courts agree with this 
line of reasoning, while other courts hold that unsecured claims and deficiency 
claims – regardless of their nonrecourse character – are substantially similar and 
should be classified together.231  Like the third-party source argument, the § 
1111(b) rationale for separate classification is jurisdictional and the outcomes 
are unpredictable.  Notwithstanding, the good-faith examination puts a justified 
burden on the SARE debtor to articulate why deficiency claims are dissimilar 
from general unsecured claims or why separate classification is justified.  This 
requirement should curb abuse in SARE cases and make confirmation more 
efficient and less costly for creditors. 
C.  Impairment and Good Faith 
Like the classification issue, courts do not need to construe § 1124 and § 
1129(a)(10) in order to make a determination of the artificial impairment issue.  
The issue comes down to the debtor’s good faith in proposing such a plan.232  
Indeed, an artificial impairment analysis requires an inquiry into the debtor’s 
motives and courts are finding this argument more persuasive than simply 
attacking the language and meaning of § 1129(a)(10).233 
In In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,234 for example, the debtor proposed a 
plan in which the trade claims were not paid in full.  Bank of America argued, 
in part, that the only reason for not paying the trade creditors in full was to create 
an impaired class that would vote to accept the plan.  The Seventh Circuit stated: 
                                                 
 228. See id. at 540–41. 
 229. Id. at 538. 
 230. Id. at 529–30. 
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Although we have never before adopted the Eighth Circuit’s “artificial 
impairment” test, we believe that, even assuming that the Eighth 
Circuit’s interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) is the appropriate standard, 
the bankruptcy court did not err in its application here.  We have noted, 
in discussing In re Windsor, that “[a] finding of ‘artificial impairment’ 
requires an inquiry into the purposes of the debtor.”  In re 
Windsor recognizes that the question of motivation is one for the 
bankruptcy court, whose resolution of the question is entitled to 
deference . . . . The bankruptcy court found that there were legitimate 
reasons for impairing the trade claims class. Impairing these claims 
allowed more money to be dedicated to the successful reorganization 
of the debtor.  The court distinguished this situation from the one at 
issue in In re Windsor in which the only impairment was to wait 60 
days to pay the “artificially impaired” class in full, and the debtor’s 
only purpose for doing so . . .  was to create an impaired class to 
approve the plan. In short, the bankruptcy court explicitly found that 
there was no lack of good faith by LaSalle’s failure to pay the trade 
claims in full.  We are not left with the definite and firm conviction 
that the bankruptcy court has made a mistake with respect to this 
issue.235 
Another case in the Seventh Circuit addressed artificial impairment under § 
1129(a)(10), but focused on good faith and the debtor’s motivations.236 In In re 
Greenwood Point, LP,237 the debtor separately classified a secured tax claim, 
and proposed deferred interest payments of $12,442.80 on the claim over two 
months after the effective date of the plan, despite having sufficient funds to pay 
the amount on the effective date.238  A creditor objected on the basis that the 
claim was artificially impaired for the sole purpose of obtaining acceptance by 
at least one impaired class pursuant to § 1129(a)(10).239  The court first found 
that “[i]f motivation of the debtor was to alter treatment of a class solely to obtain 
plan approval by at least one impaired class, and for no legitimate business 
purpose, the class is artificially impaired and its acceptance cannot be used to 
satisfy Section 1129(a)(10).”240  The court further found that “nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code prevents a debtor from negotiating a plan in order to gain 
acceptance, including impairment of claims.”241  “[A] plan proponent may 
impair a class of claims” and “[i]f the impaired class accepts the plan, the 
requirement of [§] 1129(a)(10) is satisfied.”242 
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Like classification, the author believes impairment of claims should be subject 
to the good faith requirement under § 1129(a)(3).  Courts continue to take 
different views on de minimis impairment of claims under § 1129(a)(10).  
Engaging in a good faith analysis and focusing on the debtor’s motives is 
consistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and avoids the disorder 
created by focusing on the language of § 1124 and § 1129(a)(10).243 
The author does not necessarily contend that artificial impairment constitutes 
bad faith as a matter of law, but argues that, like the classification issue, a 
presumption of bad faith should exist in SARE cases when artificial impairment 
is present.  The author suggests a SARE debtor can overcome this presumption 
by demonstrating, in its proposed plan of reorganization, that the proposed 
impairment is necessary for economical reasons and not just to achieve a cram 
down over the objecting creditor.  This presumption and burden require the 
debtor to provide evidence in its plan concerning a valid, economical reason 
concerning the impairment of the class.244 Several recent cases seem to support 
this position.245 
In a 2016 case, Village Green I, GP v. Fannie Mae (In re Village Green I, 
GP),246 the debtor owed its former lawyer and accountant a total of less than 
$2,400.  The debtor created a separate class for those two creditors and impaired 
the class by proposing to pay the claims in full over sixty days rather than up 
front.247  The Debtor argued that the impairment was justified by the debtor’s 
need to “ration every dollar.”248  The court found the debtor’s reasoning 
“dubious,” and held that the separate classification of the claims violated § 
1129(a)(3)’s good faith requirement.249  The only other creditor in Village Green 
was Fannie Mae, a secured creditor that was owed $8.6 million.250  There were 
no other unsecured creditors. Furthermore, the debtor’s expected monthly net 
income after confirmation was $71,400, which the court found was more than 
enough to pay de minimis claims of $2400.251 
In In re RYYZ, LLC,252 the court discussed indicia of impermissible artificial 
impairment, which, again, would go to the issue of good faith.  In RYYZ, the 
court found that “based on the [d]ebtor’s current projections and/or the purported 
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ability of the [d]ebtor’s principles to contribute $250,000, it would appear that 
the debtor” could quite easily pay the impaired amount of the claim at issue.253  
In other words, proof that a debtor can “pay a higher claim if necessary was 
‘fatal to [the debtor’s] argument that a valid business reason motivated the 
proposed’ impairment of a lesser claim.’”254  The court further noted that the 
“impaired” claim “is a mere 1.7 percent of” of the objecting creditor’s total 
claim.255  The court also found that “[u]nder these circumstances allowing [the 
de minimis class] to be used to cramdown [the] plan over [the objecting creditor] 
was ‘simply inconsistent with the principles underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code.’”256 
In In re Swartville,257 the court denied confirmation of the debtor’sCchapter 
11 plan upon finding that it failed to satisfy the good faith requirement of § 
1129(a)(3).258  In that case, with the exception of the objecting large secured 
creditor, “the debtor [scheduled] only four non-insider unsecured creditors… 
[with] claims total[ing] $8,901.”259  Only one ballot was cast in that class, an 
acceptance from a creditor with a claim of $1,170, failing which, the debtor 
would not have been able to effectuate a cramdown of the secured creditor.260  
Moreover, the original amount of the loan was $1,615,000 and the secured 
creditor’s claim totaled $1,624,530, suggesting that very few payments had been 
made prior to filing the bankruptcy petition.261  Lastly, and of great significance 
to the court, the plan provided for payment of the unsecured claims within 60 
days of the plan’s effective date by the guarantors; however, one of the 
guarantors testified that he could pay those claims immediately, and actually 
offered to do so during the hearing.262  The evidence in that case strongly 
supported a finding of bad faith, resulting in denial of confirmation. 
In another case also decided in 2016, a debtor’s plan was not confirmable both 
because of improper classification and artificial impairment.263  In In re 
Autterson, one of the creditors, Sherman & Howard, was allegedly owed 
$10,000.264 In a surprisingly common situation, “Sherman & Howard never filed 
a proof of claim against the [d]ebtor”, yet the debtor listed it on its schedules as 
an undisputed debt “of exactly $10,000 – ‘not a penny more, not a penny 
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less.’”265  Sherman & Howard had also represented the debtor in several 
matters.266  The debtor placed Sherman & Howard in an “administrative 
convenience” class separate from other unsecured claims and “proposed to pay 
[it] 80% of [its] claim (i.e., only $8,000 instead of $10,000)”.267 
The court held that “the [d]ebtor’s plan [was] unconfirmable because the 
obvious purpose of the improper classification was to manipulate and 
gerrymander acceptance of the plan.”268  In fact, the court stated that “the 
[d]ebtor created a bogus and artificially impaired administrative convenience 
class to gerrymander consent.”269  The court noted that small administrative 
expense classes are normal in bankruptcy cases because it allows a plan to reduce 
the number of creditors eligible to vote.270  “This result”, the court stated, “is 
accomplished by offering creditors holding small claims of perhaps a few 
hundred dollars each a 100% payment and thus providing that they are not 
impaired.”271  The court found that “[b]y doing so, the debtor avoids the cost of 
sending disclosure statements, soliciting votes from the de minimis creditors, 
and making fractional distributions.”272  But that is not what the debtor did in 
Autterson. It “did the opposite.”273  It “decided to pay [its law firm] only 80% 
(instead of 100%) of the [] claim in order to create an impaired class that could 
vote in favor [of its plan].274  The court noted that “there may be legitimate 
reasons not to propose full payment in some proceedings” but “the debtor 
offered no evidence or explanation to justify creating the separate administrative 
convenience class and them impairing it.”275  Thus, “the court easily conclude[d] 
that the [d]ebtor artificially impaired” that class of claims.276 
Based on the foregoing, the author offers two conclusions when impairment 
of de minimis claims exist in SARE cases.  First, the issue of artificial 
impairment goes to § 1129(a)(3).  Second, economic justification for impairment 
should be the sole factor in the good faith determination.  Some courts appear to 
be following this good-faith analysis with economic considerations.  For 
example, in a case focusing on good faith and inquiring into the motives of the 
debtor for creating and impairing a small class, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Central District of California stated that “this smells . . . like a device to create 
                                                 
 265. Id. at 395. 
 266. Id. at 394. 
 267. Id. at 395–97. 
 268. Id. at 396. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 397 (citing In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 32 B.R. 106, 108 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
 271. Id. at 397. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
318 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:2 
an impaired consenting class.”277  The court noted that “a doctrine has emerged 
that that ‘artificial impairment’ is a form of gerrymandering and when abusively 
used is held to be antithetical to the good faith which must be at the center of 
any reorganization effort.”278  As such, the court held that “the plan’s proposal 
in ‘good faith’ necessary under § 1129(a)(3) is consequently also left very much 
in doubt.  Debtor bears the burden on this and that burden is not carried.”279  The 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit similarly stated that, 
[w]here the plan contemplates the debtor’s continuation in business 
and the reasonable cash needs of that business – to meet accrued and 
foreseeable expenses and to make reasonable provision for 
contingencies – require some or all of the cash on hand that might 
otherwise be paid to plan creditors on confirmation, that need justifies 
the plan’s deferment of payment to the plan creditors.280 
Case law clearly supports the proposition that impairment of de minimis 
claims without economic justification is relevant to the good-faith inquiry and, 
indeed, antithetical to Chapter 11 reorganization.281  The issue in these types of 
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or procured’ in bad faith.”  In re Quigley Co., Inc., 437 B.R. 102, 130–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “procurement,” as “[t]he act of getting or obtaining 
something or bringing something about.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (9th ed. 2009).  
Webster’s has defined it similarly to mean “to get possession of,” “to cause to happen or be done: 
bring about,” and “to prevail upon to do something indicated.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1809 (1981). 
  Does § 1126(e) give creditors an additional vehicle to thwart single-asset real estate cases 
by “designating” votes “procured” or otherwise tainted by improper classification and artificial 
impairment?  The author argues it does.  The consequence of a designation under § 1126(e) is that 
the vote is disregarded in the counting of votes to determine whether a class has accepted or rejected 
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cases is not whether the claims are impaired, as the Code defines them, but 
whether the debtor impaired them without justification.  Arguments about the 
Code’s definition of impairment and the proper construction of the statutory text 
is ineffective and results in inconsistent case law.282  When improper impairment 
is the issue, the debtor must address § 1129(a)(3).283  As stated by the Fifth 
Circuit, “though we reject the concept of artificial impairment as developed in 
Windsor, we do not suggest that a debtor’s methods for achieving literal 
compliance with § 1129(a)(10) enjoy a free pass from scrutiny under § 
1129(a)(3).”284  Indeed, “a plan proponent’s motives and methods for achieving 
compliance with the voting requirement of § 1129(a)(10) must be scrutinized, if 
at all, under the rubric of § 1129(a)(3).”285  This level of scrutiny should be 
heightened in SARE cases with a presumption of bad faith when impairment of 
de minimis claims exists.  This presumption can be overcome with evidence 
showing economic justification for such impairment.  This framework does not 
operate decisively to block reorganization in SARE cases, but it should operate 
to curtail abuses of the bankruptcy process. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The conflict over improper classification and artificial impairment is widely 
prevalent in SARE cases.286 The current approaches developed by the courts 
yield confusion and make the reorganization process in SARE cases needlessly 
complex, costly, and unpredictable.287  Courts can avoid these problems by 
analyzing improper classification and artificial impairment issues under the 
good-faith requirement found in § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
must be satisfied for the confirmation of any proposed plan of reorganization.288 
Because there is a strong likelihood in SARE cases that isolation of deficiency 
claims and impairment of friendly de minimis claims is being utilized for the 
                                                 
the plan.  In re Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., 388 B.R. 202, 230 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008).  This 
paper recognizes courts may have issues with this argument.  Section 1126(e) does not specifically 
refer to a bad faith creation of a claim as a basis to designate a vote.  On a strict reading, it only 
applies to bad faith in the solicitation or procurement of the vote, not to the creation of the claim 
on which the vote is cast.  Notwithstanding, the author believes procurement should be read broadly 
and could stretch to implicate situations where the debtor purposefully creates a class an accepting 
impaired class through improper classification or artificial impairment. 
 282. See supra notes 164–89 and accompanying text. 
 283. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d 239, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2013); see generally 
supra notes 189–204. 
 284. Village at Camp Bowie, 710 F.3d at 239. 
 285. Id. at 247. 
 286. See supra Part IV (discussing improper classification and artificial impairment issues in 
SARE cases). 
 287. See supra Part IV (noting that classification issues in SARE cases result in numerous 
challenges to successful reorganization). 
 288. In re Village Green I, GP, 811 F.3d 816, 819 (6th Cir. 2016) (discussing the general 
requirement that reorganization plans pass review under the § 1129(a)(3) good faith standard). 
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sole purpose of achieving a forced confirmation over the objection of a truly 
harmed creditor, a presumption should exist that the SARE debtor is not 
exhibiting a fundamental fairness in dealing with its creditors as required by § 
1129(a)(3).289  With no explanation or justification, courts have been placing the 
burden on creditors to prove that the debtor has not proposed its plan in good 
faith, after which the burden shifts to the debtor to demonstrate the existence of 
good faith in its proposal of its plan.290  This burden-shifting scheme – 
particularly in SARE cases – is backwards and prejudicial to creditors.  It should 
be the debtor that shoulders the initial burden. 
When it comes to separate classification of deficiency claims, the SARE 
debtor may overcome the bad-faith presumption by showing that the deficiency 
claim is either (1) not substantially similar to other unsecured claims or (ii) that 
it is not being separately classified to gerrymander a consenting class of impaired 
claims.291  Similarly, de minimis impairment of claims under § 1129(a)(10) 
would require the SARE debtor to provide evidence in its plan concerning a 
valid, economical reason concerning the impairment of the class.292  Case law 
supports this proposition and the abuse found in SARE cases warrants a change 
and some uniformity.293 
 
                                                 
 289. See generally supra Part IV (analyzing how a new bad faith presumption would interact 
with the current framework of Chapter 11 reorganization). 
 290. See supra note 215; see also In re Dean, 166 B.R. 949, 952 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1994); In re 
Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997) (illustrating 
generally the burden on creditors to challenge improper classifications). 
 291. See generally supra Part IV. 
 292. In re Tucson Self–Storage, Inc., 166 B.R. 892, 898 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the 
importance of a valid business or economic justification for a separate classification structure in a 
reorganizing plan). 
 293. Id. 
